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Ontological Commitments 
by W I L L I A M  P. A L S T O N  
UNIVERSITY OF M I C H I G A N  
DVglNG the past half-century m a n y  philosophers have occupied themselves 
with translating one linguistic expression into another ,  or wi th  providing 
general schema for such translations. And  some of them,  sensitive to 
charges of engaging in parlor games dur ing working hours,  have tried, in 
various ways, to exhibit  the  serious value of such activities. I wan t  to con- 
sider one  very popular  sort of philosophic t rans la t ion- - the  sort which  goes 
f rom sentences of the  fo rm 'The re  are P 's '  (or f rom other  sentences which 
obviously imply  sentences of this form, such as ' T h e  P is R ' )  to sentences 
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of some other form. And I want to consider one very common explanation 
of the point of such translations--viz., that they enable us to avoid "on- 
tological commitments" to P's. It will be my contention that this explana- 
tion is basically confused, and that it only succeeds in raising a dust which 
obstructs our view of the real point of such translations. 
Let's begin by considering an example from Morton White's recent 
book, Toward Reunion in Philosophy. 1 He is speaking of the sentences 
'There is a difference in age between John and Tom' and 'There is a possi- 
bility that James will come.' 
"How, then, can we clarify these puzzling sentences and yet avoid the 
unwelcome conclusion that there are possibilities and age-differences in 
our universe . . . 
"In the case of 'There is a difference in age between John and Tom,' 
we might begin by saying that we understand the relational predicate 'is 
as old as' and that we test statements of the form 'x is as old as y' with- 
out having to see that x has some queer thing called an age, that y has 
one, and that these ages are identical. In that event, the belief of the 
ordinary man that there is a difference in age between John and Tom 
would be rendered in language that is not misleading by saying instead, 
simply, 'It is not the case that John is as old as Tom.' We might offer an 
analogous translation of 'There is a possibility that James will come' in 
which we replace it by some statement about the statement 'James will 
come,' for example by the statement that this statement is not certainly 
false . . . .  what we have done is to show that we need not assert the exist- 
ence of age-differences or the existence of possibilities in communicating 
what we want to communicate." (Pp. 68-69.) 
Here are several philosophically interesting translations of this sort (which 
I shall call 'existential reduction'): 
1. There is a possibility that James will come. 
2. The statement that James will come is not certainly false. 
3. There is a meaning which can be given to his remarks. 
4. His remarks can be understood in a certain way. 
5. There are many virtues which he lacks. 
6. He might conceivably be much more virtuous than he is. 
7. There are facts which render your position untenable. 
8. Your position is untenable in the light of the evidence. 
Now it is puzzling to me that anyone should claim that these translations 
"show that we need not assert the existence of" possibilities, meanings, 
virtues, and facts "in communicating what we want to communicate." 
For if the translation of (1) into (2), for example, is adequate, then they 
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are normally used to make the same assertion. In uttering (2) we would 
be making the same assertion as we would make if we uttered (1), i.e., 
the assertion that there is a possibility that James will come. And so we 
would be asserting that there is a possibility (committing ourselves to the 
existence of a possibility) just as much by using (2) as by using (1). If, 
on the other hand, the translation is not adequate, it has not been shown 
that we can, by uttering (2), communicate what we wanted to communi- 
cate when we uttered (1). Hence the point of the translation cannot be 
put in terms of some assertion or commitment from which it saves us. 
This dilemma has more than a passing resemblance to the "paradox of 
analysis," which was extensively discussed a short while ago. (If x is ade- 
quately analyzable as y, then 'x' and 'y' must be synonymous. But if so, 
how can we convey any information by saying 'x is y.') Some philosophers 
attempted (unsuccessfully in my opinion) to resolve the paradox of analysis 
by pointing out differences between the meanings of 'x' and 'y' which were 
sufficient to make the analysis informative, but not so great so to render 
it invalid. Similar gambits might be tried here, although the omens are 
no more favorable than before. 
A. It may be said that (1) differs from (2) only in carrying an impu- 
tation of 'ultimate reality' to possibilities, in implying that possibilities are 
among the 'ultimate furniture of the universe.' Thus in replacing (1) with 
(2) we continue to say everything we have any need or right to say, slough- 
ing off only the groundless, and gratuitous, attribution of ultimate reality. 
Before we can accept this account we must understand what is meant 
by 'ultimate reality' and this is not altogether easy. What  can be meant 
by 'taking possibilities to be ultimately real,' other than simply asserting, 
seriously and with full awareness of what we are doing, that, for example, 
there is a possibility that James will come? And this can be done by the 
use of (2) as well as (1). 2 But suppose that some meaning can be given 
to the phrase 'ultimate reality,' such that (2) does not carry with it an 
implication of the ultimate reality of possibilities. It is still worthy of note 
that no one has given adequate reason for the supposition that (1), as 
ordinarily used, carries any such implication either. VVhat evidence is there 
that the ordinary man in uttering (1), or the scientist in uttering a sen- 
fence like 'There are fourteen electrons in this atom,' is asserting the 
ultimate reality of possibilities or electrons in any sense which goes beyond 
the serious and deliberate use of these sentences to make assertions? Of 
course a philosopher who utters such sentences as 'Possibilities are ulti- 
mately real,' 'Possibilities are objective entities,' etc., is asserting the 
ultimate reality of possibilities if anyone ever is. But does that justify us 
in saying that he is making the same assertion when he utters (1)? Well, 
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perhaps the fact that he uses these queer sentences is an indication that 
his use of (1) carries a metaphysical implication. But if it does then pre- 
cisely for that reason he will not admit that by using (2) he can just as 
well say what he wanted to say when he used (1). This is our problem 
all over again. Wherever (1), unlike (2), does carry a metaphysical force, 
the translation is not adequate. Thus the analysis would only have the 
virtue of showing us that we could say what we want to say without mak- 
ing an ontological commitment  to possibilities, except where we want to 
make an ontological commitment  to possibilities. In this case it would 
be less than a parlor game. 
B. Alternatively, admitting that talk of 'ultimate reality' is unclear, or 
even unintelligible, one might locate the value of the analysis in the dis- 
solution of this unclarity, i.e., in the fact that (2) says everything that is 
clearly said by (1) but  without these confused suggestions of ultimate 
reality. But does (1) as ordinarily used carry such suggestions? Even if it 
does and even if this account is substantially correct, it offers no aid and 
comfort to the ontological interpretation. The ontological interpretation 
presupposes that there is an activity called 'admitting the (ultimate) exist- 
ence of possibilities' which we might or might not perform, and the per- 
formance or nonperformance of which hinges on whether we employ (1) 
or (2) to say what we want to say (or on whether we use (1) with or 
without the realization that it can be translated by (2)) .  But to say that 
phrases like 'ultimate existence' are unintelligible is to say that we can't 
understand what such an activity would be, or what it would be like to 
perform it, and so are unable to specify what admission it is from which 
the translation saves us. In other words, on the present account, what the 
translation enables us to avoid is not certain commitments or assertions, 
but certain confusions. This clue will be taken up later. But first--back to 
the ontologist. 
These moves have not proved fruitful. But there is indeed one thing, 
not yet explicitly mentioned, which the translation of (1) into (2) does 
enable us to avoid, and that is the sentence, (1). More generally the 
schema of which this translation is an instance enables us to say what we 
want to say without having to use any sentences of this form, i.e., any 
sentence beginning with 'There is (are),' followed by 'a possibility . . .' 
' the possibility . . .' ('possibilities . . .' 'some possibilities . . .'), etc. And 
the hard-pressed ontologist may make a stand here by roundly declaring 
that the ability to avoid sentences of this form is what he means by avoid- 
ing an ontological commitment.  That  is, he will define 'ontological com- 
mitment  to possibilities' as the inability to say what we want to say with- 
out using such sentences. 
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To be at all plausible this definition will have to be patched up. As it 
stands, we could avoid an ontological commitment  to possibilities simply 
by introducing a new word as synonymous with 'there is,' or with 'possi- 
bility.' This makes the game too easy. The  rules can be tightened by re- 
quiring that the restatement consist only of existing expressions with their 
established meanings. But that won't  be enough. No one could consider 
the translation of (1) into 'The possibility exists that James will come' to 
constitute an evasion of an ontological commitment.  The trouble is that 
there are a number of expressions in common use ( ' . . .  exists,' 'some 
9 . .') which do essentially the same job as 'there is'; let us speak of these 
expressions as having an explicitly existential force? The sort of transla- 
tion we are trying to specify is a translation from a sentence which con- 
tains one of these expressions, along with the crucial predicate terms, into 
a sentence which does not. Taking account of this let us restate the defini- 
tion of ontological commitment  as follows: 
I. One is ontologically committed to P's if and only if he is unable to 
say what he wants to say without using a sentence of the form 'There 
is (are) a P . . . (the P . . . ,  P's . . . ,  etc.) '  or some other sentence 
which deviates from this form only by replacing 'there is' by some 
other expression with explicit existential force or by replacing 'P' by a 
synonym (together with such grammatical changes as are required by 
these replacements, as in the change from 'There are some lions in 
this country' to 'Lions exist in this country').4 
By a not so fortuitous circumstance this criterion is substantially equiva- 
lent to Quine's famous criterion for ontological commitment.  
II. W e  are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only 
if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities 
over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirma- 
tions true. (From a Logical Point of View, p. 13.) '~ 
An entity is assumed by a theory if and only if it must be counted 
among the values of the variables in order that the statements affirmed 
in the theory be true. (Ibid., p. 103.) 
The equivalence can be seen as follows. The variables of a theory must 
range over P's in order to make the affirmations of that theory true if and 
only if one of those affirmations is either 'There are P's' or some statement 
which implies 'There are P's,' such as 'There are R's and all R's are P's.' 
Of  course Quine's criterion applies explicitly only to "theories" which are 
in quantificational form. But he himself points out that the criterion is 
applicable to theories otherwise expressed provided they can be translated 
into this form. And I see no reason why any English sentence beginning 
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with 'there is' cannot be translated into one beginning '3x.' In fact II can 
be viewed as a narrower version of I, since '3x' is one of the expressions 
which does essentially the same job as 'there is.' Hence although the fol- 
lowing remarks will be explicitly directed, for the most part, to I, they wiI1, 
I believe, apply equally to II. 
Do we, then, adequately bring out the merits of existential reduction 
by saying that it enables us to avoid "ontological commitments," in the 
sense specified by these criteria? These criteria do point up the way in 
which such translations enable us to cut down the number of sentences 
of an explicitly existential form which we use (or to reduce the range of 
our variables). And in certain contexts this may be a virtue. There may 
be desires, widespread among logicians, which are satisfied by such reduc- 
tions. And for certain purposes of theory construction or formalization it 
might be desirable to have as narrow a range of variable substitutions as 
possible. But it is at best misleading, and at worst flatly incorrect, to record 
this achievement by saying that we have avoided making an ontological 
commitment to P's, or avoided asserting the existence of P's. For the 
achievement consists, to return to our chief example, in finding some other 
sentence which can be used to make the same statement which one had 
been making in uttering (1). And, in any ordinary sense of these terms, 
whether a man admits (asserts) the existence of possibilities depends on 
what statement he makes, not on what sentence he uses to make that 
statement. One admits that possibilities exist whenever he assertorially 
utters (1), or any other sentence which m e a n s  the same (would ordinarily 
be used to make the same statement). It is a question of what he says, not 
of how he says it. Hence he cannot repudiate his admission by simply 
changing his words? 
A man who was afraid of policemen would be reassured if he were con- 
vinced that there are no policemen. But he would not be reassured if he 
were convinced that one could express all one's beliefs in a language which 
took not policemen, but rather policemanship, as values of variables (that 
one could avoid locutions like 'There is a policeman around the corner' in 
favor of 'Policemanship is exemplified around the corner'). Nor could we 
convince a scientist that the assumption of the existence of electrons can 
be dispensed with, simply by providing a way of translating every sentence 
of the form '(3x) (x is an electron . . .)' into another sentence which has 
the same meaning but which does not require variables to range over elec- 
trons, though he would be convinced if we could provide a theory which 
did the same jobs as his electronic theory but contained no individual sen- 
tences which were synonymous with his sentences asserting the existence 
of electrons. That is, in any context where questions of existence arise the 
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problem is whether or not we shall assert that so-and-so exists, not whether 
we shall choose some particular w~y of making this assertion. This means 
that assertion of existence, commitment to existence, etc., does not consist 
in the inflexible preference for one verbal formulation over any other, how- 
ever gratifying such preferences may be to logicians, and that the use of 
the phrase 'ontological commitment '  here is unjustifiable and misleading. 
Of course Quine could say that the notational question is what he is 
interested in and that, ordinary usage be damned, this is what he is using 
"ontological commitment'  to mean. But the whole point of his using 'on- 
tological commitment'  for this purpose rather than some other phrase (and 
the associated use of cognate expressions like 'believe in the existence of,' 
"countenance abstract entities,' etc.) is to associate, or identify, the ter- 
minological problem with existential problems as they are ordinarily con- 
ceived, and so transfer to the former the interest and importance which 
attaches to the latter. Otherwise why present the values of variables formula 
as a criterion for 'ontological commitment'  instead of just as something 
which is interesting in its own right? The fact that Quine intends his cri- 
terion to be more than just notational in import is further brought out by 
(1) his insistence that ontological questions (as he formulates them) are 
not different in kind from scientific questions; (2) his use of considerations 
other than notational convenience (queerness, unobservability) in deciding 
what values of variables it might be desirable to avoid. 
Thus in the last analysis the ontological interpretation can offer no 
rationale of existential reduction other than the notational convenience 
attaching to the avoidance of certain verbal forms. But surely this sort of 
analysis has more significance than that. To get at its significance I shall 
relapse for a moment into ontological terminology and ask the hitherto 
neglected question 'Why should anyone wish to avoid an ontological com- 
mitment to, for example, possibilities?' More generally, why do the on- 
tological analysts bend their efforts toward escaping from ontological com- 
mitments to "abstract entities" (attributes, classes, possibilities, meanings, 
facts, etc.) rather than to "concrete entities" (physical objects, events, per- 
sons, etc.). The reasons most commonly cited are these (Ockham's razor 
is not relevant here, since the question is not why we should ever try to 
avoid ontological commitments, but why we should aim at paring off 
abstract rather than concrete entities): 
1. Possibilities, etc., are queer. 
2. Possibilities, etc., are obscure in their nature. 
3. Possibilities, etc., are unobservable (there is no empirical reason for 
supposing that there are any such things). 
Obviously these reasons are not expressed very clearly. To say that a 
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possibility is queer or obscure is no argument against its existence; on the 
contrary it is a conclusive argument for its existence. Possession of any 
characteristic entails, or presupposes, existence. And the unobservability 
of possibilities is not a matter of fact like the unobservability of mangoes 
on my desk or of unicorns. It is rather that we can't understand what it 
would be like to empirically observe a possibility. 
These complaints are captious. But they do show that the objections to 
abstract entities would be more precisely expressed by talking not about 
possibilities, but about what people say about possibilities. It is because 
people sometimes say (and ask) such queer and obscure things about possi- 
bilities, and talk about them in empirically untestable ways, that our on- 
tological analysts are so loath to "make an ontological commitment to 
possibilities," i.e., are so loath to use a sentence like (1). More specifically, 
the tendency to shy away from sentences like (1) is due to the fact that 
people who attach a great deal of importance to such sentences (and 
resist replacing them with sentences of other forms) are liable to: 
1. Ask such puzzling questions as 'Are possibilities eternal?' 'Can a propo- 
sition be immediately intuited?' 'What are the parts of a fact?' 'Are there 
negative facts as well as positive ones?' 
2. Propound 'theories' which are unintelligible, or at least such that we 
cannot find any relevant arguments for or against them. For example, 'Pos- 
sibilities contain in their essence a reference to actuality' 'Every true state- 
ment corresponds with a fact' 'Attributes have an existence independent of 
their exemplifications' 'Meanings are known by intuition.' 
3. Take the existence (or ultimate existence) of such entities as prob- 
lematic, subject to proof or disproof, even after ordinary sentences like (1) 
have been accepted, without giving an intelligible account of the difference 
between asserting ultimate existence in this problematic sense and simply 
assenting to the ordinary sentence. 
But if (1) and (2) are synonymous, why should (1) and not (2) suffer 
this abuse, and how can the replacement of (1) with (2) alleviate the 
situation? It is at this point that the real virtue of this sort of translation 
can be seen. Consider the following parallels: 
There is a possibility that James will 
c o m e  
There is a meaning which can be 
given to his words 
There are many virtues which he 
lacks 
There is a fruit that James will 
eat 
There is a chair which can be 
given to his aunt 
There are many articles of 
clothing which he lacks 
In each case the strong verbal similarity provides a temptation to assimilate 
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the two sorts of existents, i.e., to suppose that we can talk of one in the 
same way as the other. Since chairs have spatial locations, we are apt to ask 
about the (ontological) locus of meanings. (See Whitehead on Ood as 
the locus of "eternal objects.") Physical objects like chairs and fruits con- 
sist of parts which can be specified, unless they are atomic; and so we are 
led into asking whether facts or propositions are atomic, and if not what 
their parts are like. ~ Since this is a story which has been often, and ably, 
told in the recent literature, I shall not elaborate it further. The moral to 
be drawn here is that the only "ontological commitment" to possibilities 
which there is any reason to consider undesirable is the tendency to talk 
about possibilities in inappropriate ways ("category mistakes"). 
It is the seductive grammatical family likenesses of sentences like (1) 
which render them objectionable, not any assertion of the existence of 
possibilities they carry with them, in any intelligible sense of that term. 
And the point of translating (1) into (2) lies in the fact that once any- 
one sees that what he says when he uses (1) can he just as well said by 
using (2), the power of the grammatical lure will be broken. To see that 
one can say that there is a possibility that James will come, by using either 
of two sentences of quite different grammatical forms, is to see that possi- 
bilities do not have to be talked about in the way which would be sug- 
gested by either of these forms, and hence that one does not have to ask 
about possibilities the same sort of questions one asks about chairs. To put 
it in a rather dangerous way, he sees that possibilities do not exist in the 
same way as chairs. Of course the translation doesn't prove that the same 
questions cannot be asked about possibilities and about chairs. It is rather 
that the realization that the translation holds relieves us of the compulsion 
to ask these questions about possibilities in spite of the impossibility of 
really making sense of them. 
Thus we can make explicit the virtues of existential reduction, taking 
account of the (unconfused) motives which have led people to perform 
it, without having to say what we have seen to be untenable--viz., that it 
enables us to avoid admitting the existence of something. 
This way of looking at the matter should also free us from the supposi- 
tion, which the ontological account might suggest, that when we utter (1) 
we are inevitably saying something false, at least if we haven't seen that it 
can be translated into (2), whereas we wouldn't be subject to any such 
danger in using (2), even if we didn't realize that it is translatable into (1). 
This gives rise to the idea that there is something inherently objectionable 
about (1), a sort of ontological taint. But when we see that the point of 
the translation is the neutralizing of tendencies to confusions, we see that 
the problem is essentially a strategic one. One is not necessarily misled by 
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(1), wi th  or wi thou t  a translation, nor  is one necessarily safe f rom con- 
fusion by using (2) .  T h e  t ranslat ion is a device for removing  confusions 
wherever  they arise. T h e y  usually arise in connec t ion  with  (1) ,  in which  
case we show tha t  (2) can be  used to say the  same thing; bu t  the  reverse 
procedure  migh t  conceivably be  useful. Just  as no sentence  is necessarily 
misleading,  so none  is guaranteed,  by its form, to be  used wi thou t  con- 
fusion. T h e  supposi t ion to the  contrary is one of the  unfor tuna te  effects 
of phi losophic  preoccupat ion  with  artificial languages. 
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republ icat ion as C h a p t e r  1 in The Structure  o[ Metaphysics ( N e w  York:  
Human i t i e s  Press, 1956) indicates tha t  he  considers wha t  he  said there  of 
